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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
Timothy McLaughlin had a mortgage.  As a result of 
an error, the mortgage company believed that he was in 
default and referred the matter to the law firm Phelan 
Hallinan & Shmieg, LLP, whose lawyers include Lawrence 
T. Phelan, Francis S. Hallinan, Daniel G. Schmieg, and 
Rosemarie Diamond (collectively “PHS”).  PHS sent 
McLaughlin a letter about the debt that he claims violated the 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692 et seq.  The District Court dismissed certain claims 
because McLaughlin did not ask PHS to validate the debt 
before he filed suit.  Because we conclude that he is not 
required to do so, we will reverse.  We will, however, affirm 
the District Court’s imposition of sanctions against PHS for 
its failure to produce certain documents during discovery. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
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A.  McLaughlin’s Appeal1 
 In October 2005, Timothy McLaughlin executed a 
$325,000 adjustable rate note in favor of CitiMortgage, 
secured by a mortgage on his home.  McLaughlin fell behind 
on his mortgage payments due to an error on CitiMortgage’s 
part.  In 2010, CitiMortgage referred McLaughlin’s account 
to PHS.  PHS sent him a letter (the “Letter”) dated June 7, 
2010, that stated that “[t]he amount of the debt as of 
05/18/2010” was $365,488.40.  App. 73.  This included two 
line items relevant here: $650 in “Attorney’s Fees” and $550 
for “Costs of Suit and Title Search.”  App. 54-55, 73-74.  
McLaughlin asserts, among other things, that these fees and 
costs had not actually been incurred as of the date stated in 
the Letter.   
 Rather than seek verification of the debt from PHS, 
McLaughlin filed a putative class action complaint alleging 
that PHS violated several sections of the FDCPA by, among 
other things,2 falsely representing that PHS had performed 
legal services on or before May 18, 2010.  The District Court 
dismissed the complaint without prejudice, holding that 
McLaughlin could not bring suit challenging the information 
contained in the Letter without having first disputed the 
validity of the debt pursuant to the FDCPA’s validation 
procedure.3 
                                              
 1 Because McLaughlin only appeals the dismissal of 
his claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the facts are 
drawn from McLaughlin’s First Amended Complaint.  See 
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 
2008) (stating we “accept all factual allegations as true” in 
reviewing the dismissal of a complaint) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 2 McLaughlin also alleged that the Letter gave the 
impression that attorneys had been involved in the debt 
collection activities. This claim was resolved in favor of PHS 
at summary judgment and McLaughlin does not appeal that 
ruling. 
 3 Under the FDCPA, a debt collector who sends a 
notice concerning a debt must include “the amount of the 
debt” and “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is 
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 After McLaughlin filed an amended complaint, the 
District Court issued another opinion, again stating that 
McLaughlin was required “to follow the debt validation 
procedure required by section 1692g” and that “the amended 
complaint fail[ed] to allege that” he had done so.  App. 152-
53.  The District Court also found that the fees in the Letter 
were estimates and held that “estimating the amount of 
attorneys’ fees in an itemized debt collection notice does not 
violate the FDCPA.”  App. 152-53.  For these reasons, the 
District Court dismissed McLaughlin’s claims under 15 
U.S.C. § 1692e(2) and (10)4,5 that alleged misrepresentations 
concerning the amount of the debt and the fees for services 
associated with its collection.  McLaughlin appeals this 
ruling.   
 B.  PHS’s Cross-Appeal 
                                                                                                     
owed” as well as inform the consumer that if he or she 
“notifies the debt collector in writing . . . that the debt, or any 
portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain 
verification of the debt” and mail a copy to the consumer.  15 
U.S.C. § 1692g(a).  The Letter included this information.  The 
statute further provides that if the consumer disputes the debt, 
then “the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or 
any disputed portion thereof,” until the debt collector verifies 
the debt and mails the verification to the consumer.  15 
U.S.C. § 1692g(b). 
 4 Section 1692e(2) prohibits “[t]he false representation 
of” “the character, amount, or legal status of any debt” or 
“any services rendered or compensation which may be 
lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a 
debt.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2).  Section 1692e(10) prohibits 
“[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to 
collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information 
concerning a consumer.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 
 5 The District Court also dismissed McLaughlin’s 
claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).  Section 1692f(1) prohibits 
“[t]he collection of any amount . . . unless such amount is 
expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or 
permitted by law.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).  McLaughlin does 
not challenge that ruling on appeal. 
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 One claim survived dismissal, namely McLaughlin’s 
claim that PHS violated the FDCPA by creating the false 
impression that attorneys were involved in the debt collection 
activity in violation of § 1692e(3).6  Discovery proceeded on 
this claim.  Before the motion had been decided, McLaughlin 
had served a document demand upon PHS seeking “‘[a]ll 
invoices for professional services rendered by [PHS] in 
relation to the loan of Timothy McLaughlin.’”  App. 186 
(alterations in original).   PHS objected, claiming that the 
information was not likely to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence.  In response, McLaughlin filed a motion 
to strike this objection and a motion to compel, arguing that 
the invoices were “clearly relevant” to his claim “that 
Defendants sought attorney’s fees and costs from him that 
had not been incurred and were not authorized by the 
underlying loan documents.”  Pl.’s Mot. to Strike Objections 
& Compel Disc. at 10, McLaughlin v. Phelan Hallinan & 
Schmieg, LLP, No. 10-1406 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2011), ECF. 
No. 66.  The District Court orally granted McLaughlin’s 
motion.   Despite this order, PHS did not produce the invoices 
during discovery.  Instead, they withheld them until they 
attached them to their summary judgment reply brief.   
 The District Court found that these invoices 
“contain[ed] . . . material facts” showing that PHS had in fact 
misstated the attorney’s fees and costs of suit.  App. 161.  
Specifically, the District Court noted that the invoices showed 
that PHS had incurred only $440 in total costs and $625 in 
fees, and not the $550 and $650, respectively, set forth in the 
Letter.  As a result, the District Court invited McLaughlin to 
file a motion seeking relief from its orders dismissing his 
§ 1692e(2) claim.     
 McLaughlin thereafter moved for reconsideration of 
the District Court’s dismissal order, but the motion was 
denied.  The District Court did not say that the Letter was 
accurate but rather held that it contained “reasonable 
estimates” of the itemized costs, and therefore did not violate 
the FDCPA.  App. 182-84.   
                                              
 6 Section 1692e(3) prohibits “[t]he false representation 
or implication that any individual is an attorney or that any 
communication is from an attorney.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3). 
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 The District Court, however, did find that PHS’s 
failure to produce the invoices during discovery was 
sanctionable under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A) and sua sponte 
ordered PHS to pay all expenses, including attorney’s fees, 
that McLaughlin had incurred in connection with his motion 
for reconsideration, reasoning that PHS’s action prevented 
full and timely investigation of the facts and led to additional 
briefing on the summary judgment motion.    
 The parties thereafter submitted briefs concerning the 
amount of the award.  PHS argued that the District Court 
raised the issue of sanctions sua sponte, and hence did not 
provide PHS with notice that sanctions were being 
contemplated, and asked the District Court7 to “reevaluat[e] . 
. . the imposition of sanctions” in light of its view that the 
invoices were irrelevant to the lack of attorney involvement 
claim under § 1692e(3), which was the only claim pending at 
the time discovery occurred, and to find that its 
noncompliance with the discovery order was therefore neither 
in bad faith nor willful.  Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Pl.’s Appl. 
for Att’ys Fees & Expenses at 1-2, Apr. 8, 2013, ECF No. 
111 [“ECF No. 111”].  The District Court considered this 
request, found that PHS had ample opportunity to address the 
sanctions issue, adopted the finding that the conduct was 
sanctionable, and ordered sanctions in the amount of 
$15,050.50.  PHS appeals the sanctions order.  
II.  DISCUSSION8 
 A.  FDCPA Claim  
 We will first address McLaughlin’s appeal of the order 
dismissing his claims under § 1692e(2) and (10).  We 
exercise plenary review of a district court’s order granting a 
                                              
 7 Because of Chief Judge Gary Lancaster’s passing, the 
case was reassigned to Judge Cathy Bissoon, who considered 
and resolved the parties’ arguments regarding the sanctions.   
 8 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d).  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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motion to dismiss.  Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 
212, 220 (3d Cir. 2011).9 
 1.  Debt Collection Activity 
McLaughlin contends that PHS’s Letter “knowingly 
misrepresented that, as of May 18, 2010, $650 in attorney’s 
fees and $550 in ‘costs of suit and title search’ were due and 
owing,” and hence that the Letter violates the FDCPA.  
Appellant Br. 6.  PHS contends that the Letter does not 
constitute “debt collection activity” subject to the FDCPA 
because it “made no demand for payment, contained no 
suggestion that [McLaughlin] settle the underlying debt, nor 
enter into a payment plan.”  Appellee Br. 31 (emphasis 
omitted). 
The FDCPA “regulates ‘debt collection’” but does not 
define the term.  Simon v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 
259, 265 (3d Cir. 2013).   The statute’s substantive 
provisions, however, make clear that it covers conduct “taken 
in connection with the collection of any debt.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  Put differently, 
activity undertaken for the general purpose of inducing 
payment constitutes debt collection activity.  Id.; see also 
Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 614 F.3d 380, 385 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (describing “the commonsense inquiry of whether 
a communication from a debt collector is made in connection 
with the collection of any debt”).  Thus, a communication 
need not contain an explicit demand for payment to constitute 
debt collection activity.   Simon, 732 F.3d at 266.  Indeed, 
communications that include discussions of the status of 
payment, offers of alternatives to default, and requests for 
financial information may be part of a dialogue to facilitate 
                                              
 9 In his notices of appeal, McLaughlin identified both 
the District Court’s order dismissing his claims under Rule 
12(b)(6) and the order denying his motion for reconsideration, 
but this does not affect the standard of review.  McAlister v. 
Sentry Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 550, 552-53 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(“Because an appeal from a denial of a Motion for 
Reconsideration brings up the underlying judgment for 
review, the standard of review varies with the nature of the 
underlying judgment.”). 
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satisfaction of the debt and hence can constitute debt 
collection activity.  Id.  
PHS’s Letter is plainly part of such a dialogue.  The 
Letter states that PHS is a “debt collector attempting to 
collect a debt” and that information PHS obtains “may be 
used for that purpose,” namely to collect a debt.  App. 73.  It 
then provides an invoice-like presentation of the amount due.  
The Letter also informs the recipient how to obtain “updated . 
. . payoff quotes,” meaning how to obtain current information 
about the amount that would have to be paid to satisfy the 
debt.  Id.   
It is reasonable to infer that an entity that identifies 
itself as a debt collector, lays out the amount of the debt, and 
explains how to obtain current payoff quotes has engaged in a 
communication related to collecting a debt.  Thus, the Letter 
constitutes debt collection activity under the FDCPA and 
misrepresentations contained therein may provide a basis for 
relief. 
 2.  Estimates 
McLaughlin argues that the failure to accurately set 
forth the amount due as of May 18, 2010 constitutes a 
misrepresentation actionable under § 1692e(2) and (10) and 
the order dismissing these claims should be reversed.  These 
subsections prohibit “[t]he false representation of” either “the 
character, amount, or legal status of any debt” or “any 
services rendered or compensation which may lawfully be 
received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt,” 15 
U.S.C. § 1692e(2), as well as “[t]he use of any false 
representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to 
collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a 
consumer,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). 
Each of these provisions deals with debt collectors’ 
representations to debtors.  We analyze such communications 
“from the perspective of the least sophisticated debtor.”  
Rosenau v. Unifund Corp., 539 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2008); 
Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 454 (3d Cir. 2006).  
This low standard “effectuate[s] the basic purpose of the 
FDCPA: to protect all consumers, the gullible as well as the 
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shrewd.”  Rosenau, 539 F.3d at 221 (internal quotation marks 
and alterations omitted). 
PHS contends that the Letter did not violate the 
FDCPA because it contained estimates of the amount owed.  
This characterization is inconsistent with the unequivocal 
language of the Letter.  The Letter says that it sets forth “[t]he 
amount of the debt as of 05/18/2010.” App. 73.  The only 
message this conveys to the reader is the amount owed on a 
specific date.  Nothing says it is an estimate or in any way 
suggests that it was not a precise amount.   As the drafter of 
the Letter, PHS is responsible for its content and for what the 
least sophisticated debtor would have understood from it.  See 
Glover v. FDIC, 698 F.3d 139, 149 (3d Cir. 2012) (“The 
language of [§ 1692e(2)(A)] creates a straightforward, 
objective standard.  Nothing suggests that an allowance is to 
be made for a defendant’s lack of knowledge or intent.”).  If 
PHS wanted to convey that the amounts in the Letter were 
estimates, then it could have said so.  It did not.  Instead, its 
language informs the reader of the specific amounts due for 
specific items as of a particular date.  If the amount actually 
owed as of that date was less than the amount listed, then, 
construing the facts in the light most favorable to McLaughlin 
as we must when reviewing the dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6), Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233, McLaughlin has stated a 
claim that the Letter misrepresents the amount of the debt in 
violation of § 1692e(2) and (10).  
 3.  Prerequisite to Filing Suit 
PHS argues that it nonetheless cannot incur “liability 
as a matter of law where it has complied with the debt 
validation procedure set forth in the FDCPA,”10Appellee Br. 
                                              
 10 Contrary to PHS’s argument, McLaughlin’s 
assertion is not a new theory as his pleadings show he alleged 
that the amount of the debt listed in the Letter was inaccurate.  
See App. 63 (First Amended Complaint alleging the Letter 
“misstated the amount of the debt” and gave “a false 
impression of the amount of the alleged debt”), 182 (District 
Court stating “McLaughlin argues that PHS violated section 
1692e(2) of the FDCPA because the attorneys’ fees and costs 
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26-27 (emphasis omitted), and McLaughlin did not seek to 
validate the debt described in the Letter.11  This argument 
lacks any statutory support. 
The statute’s text provides no indication that Congress 
intended to require debtors to dispute their debts under § 
1692g before filing suit under § 1692e, and in fact, the 
statutory language suggests the opposite.  The language of § 
1692g indicates that disputing a debt is optional.  The statute 
lists consequences “[i]f the consumer” disputes a debt, 15 
U.S.C. § 1692g(b)12 (emphasis added), and it makes clear that 
                                                                                                     
stated in the Letter do not match the attorneys’ fees and costs 
stated in contemporaneous invoices”).   
 11 Several district courts share this view.  See, e.g.¸ 
Bleich v. Revenue Maximization Grp., Inc., 233 F. Supp. 2d 
496, 500 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that a plaintiff could not 
sue in response to a misstated debt in a letter conforming to 
the FDCPA’s validation requirements and reasoning “[h]ad 
Plaintiff exercised her rights under the FDCPA to obtain debt 
verification, it is entirely likely that litigation would have 
been avoided”); Lindbergh v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 846 F. 
Supp. 175, 179 (D. Conn. 1994) (“[T]he court can only 
wonder why the plaintiff has chosen to impose the significant 
burden of litigation on both the defendant and this court, 
instead of simply following the cost-effective procedures 
provided by the FDCPA specifically designed to facilitate the 
exchange of information between debt collectors and 
debtors.”); see also Lorandeau v. Capital Collection Serv., 
No. 10-3807, 2011 WL 4018248, at *11-12 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 
2011) (holding that a plaintiff cannot bring a claim based 
upon a defendant’s attempt to collect an invalid debt unless 
the plaintiff disputed the debt); Palmer v. I.C. Sys., Inc., No. 
04-3237, 2005 WL 3001877, at *5  (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2005) 
(recognizing that although the FDCPA does not require a 
consumer to dispute a debt, a consumer who fails to do so 
cannot assert a claim based upon the debt collector’s attempt 
to collect an invalid debt).  As explained in the text, there is 
no statutory support for this view. 
 12 Specifically, the debt collector must 
 
cease collection of the debt, or any disputed 
portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains 
11 
 
failure to dispute a debt cannot be construed as an admission 
of liability. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(c).  Thus, the statute protects a 
prospective litigant from being penalized in a lawsuit if he or 
she chooses not to seek validation.  The absence of a pre-suit 
validation request requirement does not appear accidental 
given the protection Congress bestowed on those who opt not 
to seek validation of the debt. 
Moreover, permitting debtors to proceed under § 
1692e without first disputing their debts under § 1692g is 
consistent with this Court’s FDCPA jurisprudence, which has 
never imposed a § 1692g prerequisite and which has 
consistently emphasized the purpose of the FDCPA as a 
remedial statute, applying a “least sophisticated debtor” 
standard to “lender-debtor communications.” Brown, 464 
F.3d at 453-54; see also Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 
F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[T]he debt validation 
provisions of section 1692g were included . . . to guarantee 
that consumers . . . receive[d] adequate notice of their rights 
under the law.”).  Imposing a § 1692g dispute prerequisite in 
the absence of any statutory language requiring it would 
undermine the FDCPA’s protection of unsophisticated 
debtors, who would have no reason to suspect that they would 
be prevented from filing suit concerning deceptive 
communications as a consequence of failing to invoke the 
optional statutory validation  procedure. 
Furthermore, imposing a requirement that the debtor 
challenge the validity of the debt described in a 
communication before filing suit would have the effect of 
                                                                                                     
verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment, 
or the name and address of the original creditor, 
and a copy of such verification or judgment, or 
name and address of the original creditor, is 
mailed to the consumer by the debt 
collector. . . .  Any collection activities and 
communication during the 30-day period may 
not overshadow or be inconsistent with the 
disclosure of the consumer’s right to dispute the 
debt . . . . 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). 
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immunizing false statements that a consumer failed to 
promptly dispute.13  Put differently, if a debt collector’s 
communication was false, the debt collector would avoid 
liability for the false communication simply because a request 
to validate its contents was not made.  This would be 
inconsistent with the FDCPA’s goal of ensuring debt 
collectors act responsibly. 
Finally, declining to require debtors to lodge disputes 
under § 1692g before filing suit would not frustrate the 
FDCPA’s validation procedure.  See Lindbergh v. Transworld 
Sys., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 175, 179 (D. Conn. 1994) (contrasting 
“the significant burden of litigation” with “the cost-effective 
[validation] procedures provided by the FDCPA”).  Debtors 
will still have an incentive to follow the validation procedure 
even if pursuit of the validation process is not required to 
preserve the ability to file suit as it can enable debtors to 
cheaply and quickly resolve disputes with debt collectors.  
Moreover, because the validation process  facilitates the 
exchange of information, it may ultimately help debtors 
bolster their FDCPA claims.  See Hubbard v. Nat’l Bond & 
Collection Assocs., Inc., 126 B.R. 422, 428 (D. Del.), aff’d, 
947 F.2d 935 (3d Cir. 1991) (table) (“[T]his exchange of 
information [under § 1692g’s validation procedure] provides 
debt collectors with ‘actual knowledge’ of the facts relevant 
to their collection efforts.  This is significant because only a 
knowing violation of § 1692e is actionable.”).    
For these reasons, a consumer is not required to seek 
validation of a debt he or she believes is inaccurately 
described in a debt communication as a prerequisite to filing 
                                              
 13 Gigli v. Palisades Collection, L.L.C., No. 06-1428, 
2008 WL 3853295, at *6-7 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2008) (“If the 
debt collector employs false, deceptive, or misleading 
representations or unfair or unconscionable means in the 
course of collecting or attempting to collect a debt, the fact 
that the debt collector provided the consumer written notice 
complying with § 1692g(a) and/or the consumer never 
disputed the debt has no bearing on the debt collector’s 
liability under the FDCPA. . . .  Immunizing unscrupulous 
debt collectors, while depriving consumers of a remedy, 
would frustrate the FDCPA.”).   
13 
 
suit under § 1692e.  Thus, the District Court’s imposition of 
such a requirement was incorrect and its dismissal of 
McLaughlin’s § 1692e(2) and (10) claims on this basis was 
improper. 
B.  Sanctions  
We next address the order imposing sanctions against 
PHS.  We review the District Court’s imposition of sanctions 
under Rule 37 for abuse of discretion.  Grider v. Keystone 
Health Plan Cent., Inc., 580 F.3d 119, 134 (3d Cir. 2009).   A 
district court abuses its discretion if it “bases its ruling on an 
erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous 
assessment of the evidence.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
and alterations omitted).14  We exercise plenary review of 
PHS’s assertion that it was not provided due process before 
the District Court imposed sanctions.  Martin v. Brown, 63 
F.3d 1252, 1262 (3d Cir. 1995).   
PHS asserts that the sanction order should be reversed 
because it did not engage in sanctionable conduct and it did 
not receive notice that sanctions were being contemplated 
before they were imposed.  We will address each contention 
in turn. 
Rule 37 provides, in relevant part, that a party’s failure 
“to obey an order to provide or permit discovery” allows “the 
court  . . . [to] issue further just orders.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
37(b)(2)(A).  Rule 37 requires “the court [to] order the 
disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to 
pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused 
by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or 
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). 
                                              
 14 PHS argues that the factors listed in Poulis v. State 
Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868-70 (3d Cir. 
1984), should be considered when reviewing a trial court’s 
imposition of sanctions.  Poulis, however, addressed “the 
extreme sanction of dismissal.”  Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Because a monetary 
sanction was imposed here, Poulis is inapposite.  
14 
 
Here, there was a clear violation of the District Court’s 
discovery order.  The District Court ordered PHS to produce 
documents responsive to McLaughlin’s demand for invoices 
for any services provided relating to the debt.  PHS did not do 
so.  The District Court explained that McLaughlin’s 
document request plainly encompassed the invoices PHS 
withheld and it rejected PHS’s argument that the invoices it 
withheld were not requested.  The District Court further 
explained that PHS’s noncompliance impacted the parties’ 
investigation of the facts and caused additional briefing.  As a 
result, it properly found PHS violated the discovery order. 
PHS argues that it should not have been sanctioned for 
this noncompliance because the invoices McLaughlin 
requested were irrelevant in light of the District Court’s 
December 20, 2011 order stating that McLaughlin’s only 
remaining claim at that time was his § 1692e(3) claim 
concerning PHS’s alleged misrepresentations regarding the 
involvement of attorneys.  Appellee Br. 41.  This does not 
excuse PHS’s failure to comply with a discovery order that 
had been issued the previous day and remained extant.  
Moreover, contrary to PHS’s argument, the invoices relating 
to PHS’s work on McLaughlin’s debt were relevant under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) to McLaughlin’s then-pending 
§ 1692e(3) claim that no attorney worked on or reviewed the 
Letter.  PHS in fact acknowledged the relevancy of these 
documents by using them to support its motion for summary 
judgment.  Thus, the District Court’s conclusion that PHS’s 
noncompliance with its discovery order was sanctionable was 
correct. 
PHS argues that it was entitled to notice and an 
opportunity to respond before the District Court imposed 
sanctions.  Due process requires that the party against whom 
sanctions might be imposed receive notice that sanctions are 
being considered.  See, e.g., In re Tutu Wells Contamination 
Litig., 120 F.3d 368, 379 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The party against 
whom sanctions are being considered is entitled to notice of 
the legal rule on which the sanctions would be based, the 
reasons for the sanctions, and the form of the potential 
sanctions.”); Martin, 63 F.3d at 1262-63 (“With regard to 
sanctions, particularized notice of the grounds for the sanction 
under consideration is generally required.”).  The “mere 
15 
 
existence” of a rule or statute concerning sanctions is 
insufficient to put a party on notice that sanctions are being 
contemplated.  Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Corp., 899 F.2d 
1350, 1357 (3d Cir. 1990). 
It is true that PHS did not receive notice that sanctions 
were being considered before the District Court initially 
imposed them and hence did not immediately have an 
opportunity to argue that its failure was substantially justified.  
PHS, however, eventually provided arguments why it 
believed its conduct was not sanctionable.  More specifically, 
in connection with the briefing on the magnitude of sanctions, 
PHS explicitly laid out its  arguments why its conduct was 
substantially justified and neither in bad faith nor willful and 
asked the newly assigned District Court Judge to 
“reevaluat[e] . . . the imposition of sanctions.”   ECF No. 111.  
The District Court considered these arguments, reaffirmed the 
relevance of the discovery sought and the impact of the tardy 
production, and, for those reasons “and for all of the reasons 
previously stated in” her predecessor’s decision, ordered 
sanctions in the form of attorney’s fees.  Thus, PHS had 
notice of the conduct that the District Court found to be 
sanctionable, had an opportunity to be heard, and received 
review and a ruling from a different judge concerning their 
conduct.  Accordingly, we conclude PHS received due 
process and we will affirm the sanctions order. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 For these reasons, we will reverse the District Court’s 
order dismissing McLaughlin’s FDCPA claims under 
§ 1692e(2) and (10) and affirm its order imposing sanctions 
against PHS. 
